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ABSTRACT 
Stakeholder perspectives on crisis management provide a useful descriptive framework for analyzing crises and 
making crisis narratives. However, their “actionability” for crisis management, i.e. possibility to use stakeholder 
management models into operational crisis management processes, remains an under-investigated question. The 
purpose of this article is to discuss the operational value of stakeholder frameworks for crisis management. Drawing 
on a qualitative case study of a successful crisis management process in a public transportation company, we 
investigate the activities set up by the crisis cell to manage internal and external stakeholders during the crisis. In our 
case, successful stakeholder management relied on: 1) good diagnosis capabilities for the design of an appropriate 
corporate positioning; 2) an ability to manage coherently a set of emerging and heterogeneous issues involving 
stakeSholders ; 3) the capacity to set up a tightly coupled form of organization, involving both crisis cell members 
and various “anchorage points”, i.e. specific actors involved in the project before the crisis, who were already in 
contact with key stakeholders as part of their day-to-day activities. We then discuss the practical and theoretical 
implications of this analysis and the potential value stakeholder perspectives for crisis management.  
 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
A mounting practical and theoretical issue in the field of crisis management relates to the complexification of 
contemporary crises (Kouzmin and Haynes, 1999, 't Hart et al., 2001). Owing to the multiplication of public 
controversies around technical uncertainties (Callon et al., 2001), the increase in the number and diversity of 
stakeholders involved, snowball effects, the inter connectedness of communication and social systems, crises tend to 
become endemic, harder to control and to manage (Boin and Lagadec, 2000). Those transformations call for a 
reorientation of crisis management, traditionally focused on plans and procedures, towards learning and the 
development of adaptative capabilities to recover from unpredicted crises (Robert and Lajtha, 2001). Since crises 
increasingly create unanticipated problems, the issue becomes to “organize for resilience, i.e. to facilitate a rapid, 
flexible, innovative, and effective response when a crisis presents itself” (Boin and Lagadec, 2000: p.4).  
In those increasingly complex situations, managing stakeholders becomes both problematic and strategic for crisis 
management. Although it is a central issue, the way organizations manage dynamic stakeholders in crisis situations 
has not been systematically investigated so far, neither by the stakeholder management literature, nor by the crisis 
management literature.  
The purpose of this article is to discuss the operational value of stakeholder frameworks for crisis management. To 
do so, we draw on a qualitative case study of a crisis experienced by a public transportation company. This crisis was 
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triggered by the collapse the building site of a new metro-line of the company, under a school, in an urban 
environment. Hopefully none of the school’s pupils or the building site’s workers were present at the moment of the 
accident, but the important psychological, emotional and material impacts of the event led the company to treat 
immediately the event as an organizational crisis and to set up a crisis cell. The collapse of a building site had not 
been identified as a possible crisis to be dealt with within the transportation company, which was only in a position 
of building-owner in this project. The situation was also quite ambiguous and complex due to the blurred 
jurisdictional responsibilities and the heterogeneous set of stakeholders involved. In spite of this complexity, the 
crisis cell designed innovative and appropriate solutions to recover from a potentially damaging crisis. In this case, 
successful stakeholder management relied on a mix of both individual skills and an appropriate organization to face 
an unpredicted and complex situation. Stakeholder management was successful because it relied on: 
1) good diagnosis capabilities for the design of an appropriate corporate positioning  
2) an ability to manage coherently a set of emerging and heterogeneous issues. In this regard, the idea is not so much 
to manage stakeholders individually than to deal with various stakeS-holders, which is, from an operational point of 
view, far more complex. The company treated this complexity by managing issues coherently rather than 
stakeholders unilaterally.  
3) the capacity to set up a tightly coupled form of organization, involving both crisis cell members and various 
“anchorage points”, i.e. specific actors involved in the project before the crisis, who were already in contact with 
key stakeholders as part of their day-to-day activities.  
The article is organized as follows: first we identify several shortcomings of present stakeholder approaches of 
organizational crises that limit their actionability for operational crisis management. Next we present the crisis 
management process that we have investigated. Last we discuss the practical and theoretical implications of this 
analysis, and the potential value stakeholder perspectives for crisis management. 
 
CURRENT LIMITATIONS OF STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
Intuitively, stakeholder management appears as a relevant framework to analyze crisis management processes. The 
usual definition of a stakeholder as “any group that can affect or be affected by the achievement of organizational 
objectives” (Freeman, 1984) has first been developed to understand the relationships between the company and its 
environment in turbulent situations (Sturdivant, 1979, Management Review, 1980, Freeman and Reed, 1983). Thus, 
organizational crises situations should provide natural cases of application of stakeholder perspectives. 
Several works dealing with crisis management explicitly refer to this theoretical framework. In this part, we identify 
three limitations of those works and propose to develop a more actionable framework for understanding stakeholder 
management in crisis situations. 
 
An over-representation of normative, static and low-actionnability perspectives 
In their famous typology, Donaldson and Preston (1995) have distinguished three distinct branches of the literature 
on stakeholder management: a descriptive branch which discusses the concrete patterns of stakeholder management 
within firms, an instrumental branch which investigates the link between stakeholder management and organizational 
performance, and a normative branch (which, for the authors, constitutes the core of stakeholder theory). In its 
application to crisis management, the ‘normative’ strand of the stakeholder theory has been predominant. This 
branch of stakeholder thinking states that “the interests of all stakeholders are of intrinsic value. That is, each group 
of stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake and not merely because of its ability to further the interests of 
some other groups, such as the shareowners” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The work of Alpaslan, Mitroff and 
Green (2004) is good example of this normative import of stakeholder thinking within the field of crisis 
management. They propose that organizational behaviour towards stakeholders range from a “neo-classical 
approach” -where a group is only considered by the company if it directly contributes to shareholder value- to a 
“multi-fiduciary approach” -where all legitimate stakeholders are considered on an equal basis-. They then add an 
instrumental consideration, proposing that those companies that adopt a multi-fiduciary orientation towards 
stakeholders (or theory-in-use (Argyris and Schön, 1978)) will be less likely to experience crises and more likely to 
recover quickly from crises (Alpaslan et al., 2004). But such a perspective does not explain how, beyond a generic 
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organizational positioning (ranging from denial to responsibility,  cf Alspaslan et al.), companies concretely manages 
its stakeholders.  
We believe that in their present form, stakeholder approaches to crisis management suffer from various difficulties 
which limit their operational value: 
First, they do not take into account the specificities of each organizational crisis. When researchers investigate 
organizational learning, they evaluate the evolution of the organization in terms of its attitude (its responsiveness) 
towards its stakeholders (Shrivastava, 1974). However, for an organization to recover from a crisis, a critical 
competency may first reside in its diagnosis capabilities and in its ability to react according to the nature of the crisis. 
Thus, adopting the same positioning and acting the same way for each crisis may be a mistake. This difficulty to 
consider various types of crises may come from the tendency of the crisis management literature to focus on major 
organizational crises, defined as “low probability / high consequence events that threaten the most fundamental goals 
of an organization” (Pearson and Clair, 1998, Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, Weick, 1988). In particular, this definition 
leaves aside many situations that are blurred when they occur, in which there are no lethal injuries, where no clear 
actor is bearing jurisdictional or public responsibility for the disaster, and where the identification of primary 
stakeholders and their interests becomes problematic. Such approaches tend to bypass the analytical and strategic 
work (Preble, 1997) underpinning the positioning of the company, and restrain crisis resilience to a problem of 
organizational routines and culture: is the company a responsible citizen? Does it respond responsibly towards all its 
legitimate stakeholders?  
Second, such approaches tend to naturalize both stakeholder behaviors and corporate answers. Stakeholders’ 
identities and interests are taken as an exogenous variable of the analysis. Their identification is unproblematic, and 
the stakeholders’ salience, resources, and power are not considered as dynamic variables. For the organization, the 
main issue of stakeholder management is to identify its stakeholders, their claims, how their interests are linked with 
those of the company, and to evaluate their potential influence over corporate activities. After assessing their 
respective salience (the perceived importance of a stakeholder for a company) in terms of power, legitimacy, and 
urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997), the company can respond to each stakeholder in an appropriate way. Despite several 
authors have underlined the importance to take into account the network of relationships between stakeholders 
(Frooman, 1999, Rowley, 1997), the dominant imagery continues to rely on the idea that each relationship between 
the stakeholder and the firm can be isolated from the others, and that a clear separation can be drawn between the 
company and its stakeholders. Stakeholders exist independently from the company, their interests are not influenced 
by corporate actions. Moreover, the perspective largely remains a-historical and very few works have systematically 
investigated the link between long term stakeholder management and crisis management (Ulmer, 2001).  
Third, stakeholder approaches to crisis management rely on an implicit behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and 
March, 1963) that tends to reduce corporate actions to a stimulus – response process. We argue that this perspective 
may be over-simplistic because it denies the reflexive capabilities of the firm in the course of action: it masks the 
concrete debates and design work necessary to establish the institutional positioning of the organization. The 
problem is that the stakeholder representation of business and society interactions describes the firm as a single, 
coherent stakeholder. In this perspective, organizational behavior is under the dominant influence of top managers 
decisions, orientations and values (Freeman, 1984, Freeman, 1994). This vision is largely inconsistent with research 
findings on the organizational complexity of crisis management, which suggest that crises generate internal conflict, 
threatens corporate unity and the exercise of internal authority and coordination (Quarantelli, 1988, Lagadec, 1990). 
As a result, the dislocation and disintegration of the corporation into several divergent stakeholders constitutes a key 
risk in a crisis situation. Instead of being considered as given, a stakeholder perspective on crisis management should 
take organizational coherence and coordination as a primary research question, and try to understand how the 
company is made to behave as one stakeholder.  
 
Stakeholder management in crisis situations: from a descriptive to an actionable framework  
Finally, current stakeholder perspectives may be descriptively accurate, but they do not provide a solid and 
actionable analytical framework for managers. Actionability refers to the ability of a theory to frame action, to both 
document and influence it (Hatchuel, 2005, Argyris and Schön, 1978). As we have seen, mainstream stakeholder 
perspectives suffer from limitations related to their overly mechanical, passive and adaptative vision of 
organizational action. That is to say stakeholder perspectives on crisis management develop too broad prescriptions 
for management, and say too little about the way managers concretely manage their stakeholders in crisis situations.  
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From now on, we will try to move from a “descriptive” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) to an “actionable” (Hatchuel, 
2005) perspective of stakeholder management. In order to become actionable, we argue that it is necessary to: 
- go beyond static uses of stakeholder theorizing (Pasquero, 1996) and account for stakeholder dynamics 
(Beaulieu and Pasquero, 2002). 
- consider action as the basic research question and restore the complexity of the crisis management 
activities. 
In this perspective, two research questions can be raised about the operational validity of stakeholder perspectives: 
1. how does an organization elaborate internal coherence and cohesion to appear as a single stakeholder?  
2. how does an organization concretely manage its stakeholders during a crisis?  
To investigate those questions, we provide an analysis of a crisis management process in a public transportation 
company, after the collapse of the building site of a new metro line under a school in a dense urban environment. 
Beyond the general procedures of actors’ mobilization when the event occurred, the treatment of such a situation had 
not been anticipated by formal crises procedures. In the end, the crisis management was considered as a success: in 
an unpredicted situation, the company had managed to handle a large number of issues and stakeholders. However, 
several strategic decisions that had been taken to manage the crisis were still the object of internal controversies after 
the resolution of this disruptive episode. In this context, an in-depth research was requested by the company, to 
provide an historical analysis of the event and organize a feed-back process to provide a global understanding of the 
event. We conducted a 6 month longitudinal and qualitative study of the event. We led 20 semi-directive interviews 
with the various internal and external stakeholders involved in the crisis, and complemented them with an analysis of 
the media treatment of the crisis and the technical and administrative documents about the collapse of the tunnel. The 
following elements are derived from a report that has been submitted to and validated by the various interviewees.  
 
CASE STUDY: HOW TO MANAGE STAKES-HOLDERS IN A CRISIS SITUATION? 
To investigate these questions, we will present the crisis management process, from the collapse of the building site 
to the concrete actions taken to recover. As explained previously, the coherence of a company is endangered when it 
is confronted with a serious crisis. In this regard, the first key issue in stakeholder management was to build a 
coherent and legitimate positioning, on which internal and external actors could rely. This positioning resulted from 
an accurate diagnosis of major stakeholders and associated risks. But as soon as the actors had to act and coordinate, 
the stakeholder perspective proved to be of limited actionability. Given the high crisis complexity, right levers of 
action appeared to be issues related to the crisis rather than stakeholders. To this aim, the organization tightly 
articulated a crisis cell and “anchorage points”. We define them as specific actors involved in the project before the 
crisis. They were already in contact with key stakeholders as part of their day-to-day activities.  
 
Designing an institutional positioning? Stakeholder diagnosis and organizational adhesion 
Given the ambiguity of the initial situation, the institutional positioning was nothing but obvious. Being in a position 
of building owner, the jurisdictional responsibility of the company was not engaged. As specified in the contract, the 
performer builder had to endorse the entire responsibility for any technical incident on the building site. Moreover, 
since there was no dead or wounded and the site was quickly secured, the crisis management could have been only 
considered from a technical point of view: it was possible to start the again, provided that a technical solution was 
found.  
But the crisis communication expert understood the risks associated with this tempting positioning. Indeed the 
accident had radically altered the environment of the project. New stakeholders appeared: pupils’ parents, school’s 
teachers, the town administration in charge of the schools, media, and the police suddenly became central 
stakeholders around the project. Besides, the relationships between the company and previous stakeholders were 
transformed: actors moved from confident and cooperative relationships to distrustful and conflictual connections. 
This was the case, for example, of residents and local elected-representatives.  
This accurate representation of stakeholders helped to qualify the risks associated with a strictly jurisdictional and 
technical positioning, which would have been interpreted as a denial position. The psychological shock and the fact 
that hundreds of children could have been killed made the jurisdictional speech unbearable for external stakeholders. 
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Neglecting them would have jeopardized the project as long as the responsibilities were not clearly assigned. Beyond 
the project, such a position could have challenged the engineering competencies of the company and its ability to 
conduct such projects. This would have been disastrous for this transportation company: taking part in the design and 
the building of the infrastructure constitutes a key strategic asset. And last, risks on the corporate image were very 
important for a public company which operates in an urban environment, engaging in day-to-day relationships with 
customers. On this basis, the crisis communication expert argued that beyond its technical dimension, the crisis had 
to be managed as a complex and multi-facetted crisis. 
All these reasons convinced the crisis expert that it was essential to manage stakeholders to recover from the crisis. 
Consequently she advocated a pragmatic responsible positioning. Given the identified risks, the situation 
necessitated to respond and implement actions towards stakeholders who had been hit by the accident. This diagnosis 
was accepted within the crisis cell, but it was nevertheless questioned inside the company. In particular, the technical 
department employees found this position unfair, risky and humiliating. But the responsible positioning gained wider 
internal adhesion for two reasons. First, the crisis cell convinced that their diagnosis was relevant to secure the 
continuation of the project. Second, this institutional positioning did not prevent the company from suing the 
performer-builder. It must be added that this positioning was also made possible by the previous stakeholders 
relationships and the responsible image of the company (Alpaslan et al., 2004). 
Overall, the role of the crisis expert was crucial in this first stage of the crisis management. The central skills 
required in this first stage were fine diagnosis skills, the capacity to “target” the aim of crisis management, and the 
ability to convince that this position was the most appropriate for the company. At the end of this first stage, it was 
clear that the crisis expert was going to play a leadership role (she was clearly identified as the actor in charge of 
actions and global coordination) in the crisis management.   
This institutional responsible positioning paved the way in two directions. Internally, once accepted, such a 
positioning gave a global and coherent frame of action to direct behaviours of all implicated employees towards 
external stakeholders. Externally, it also enabled to align the company and the other stakeholders representations, 
and move towards a common representation of the crisis. This aspect constituted a key step in the management and 
resolution of a crisis (Shrivastava, 1987). 
From the moment where the responsible positioning was adopted, two new dimensions had to added to the 
management of the crisis. Next to the technical crisis, a media crisis and a local crisis had to be additionally managed 
to start the project again.  
 
Operational crisis management: from stakeholders to stakeSholders management 
Once having agreed upon a common representation of the crisis and the appropriate organizational positioning, the 
company entered the operational stage of the crisis management. We will first depict the three interrelated crises 
which had to be simultaneously solved. Then we will show that rather than stakeholders, the company had to manage 
stakeSholders.  
 
Managing simultaneously three interdependent crises 
The term “crisis” is generic and implicitly describes the crisis as a global situation with its own (but disrupted) logic. 
But in our case, the crisis was composed of three different crises. Each crisis referred to a certain category of issues, 
involved different sets of stakeholders, required specific actions, and took place in a specific scene (media, local, 
expert). Here is a brief description of the different crises that had to be managed: 
- Media crisis: the responsible positioning led to communicate about the accident, to make a statement on the 
situation and to assume the responsibility for the event. The communication was directed towards stakeholders such 
as journalists, residents, teachers and pupil’s parents and was handled through mass media communication and 
public meetings. In fact, the perceived transparency of the firm, combined with the absence of new information in the 
first days after the collapse led to a very good containment and quick resolution of the media crisis. 
- Local crisis: in parallel with communication issues, reparation actions had to be taken quickly. This involved direct 
actions towards the victims. The company paid for material damages and provided material help to affected 
stakeholders, namely residents, town-hall administration staff, teachers and pupils’ parents. For example, the firm 
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offered transportation means and took part, next to the town-hall administration, to the relocation of the classes. The 
company provided this material help until the end of the re-building of the school. 
- Technical crisis: after the collapse, the urgent task was to set the premises in safety. This was done in association 
with legal authorities and the performer builder. Then the project team focused on finding a technical solution to 
continue the project, which was identified two weeks later. This crisis involved stakeholders which had already 
worked together and could not be substituted after the collapse: the performer builder, police headquarters, quarries 
inspection and the town administration in charge of buildings and architecture.  
However, these three crises were interrelated since the resolution of the technical crisis relied on the successful 
management of the two other crises. On the one hand, the successful treatment of the media and local crises provided 
the firm with legitimacy. This was a key resource to avoid controversies about the technical aspects of the crisis. On 
the other hand, the media and local crisis could not have been treated independently from the technical crisis. The 
media crisis mobilized technical speeches through company’s engineers to “rationalise” what happened, 
paradoxically because very few explanations were available. 
Eventually, this crisis management involved the management of three crises, according to the nature of problems to 
be solved: a media crisis, a local crisis and a technical crisis. But managing coherently external stakeholders in this 
complex situation was not an obvious task.  
 
How to manage stakeSholders coherently ? Issues as actionable levers. 
Each of the three crises was related to a specific nature of issues and related operational sub-issues. At the same time, 
each stakeholder could be concerned with various stakes (issues) and be involved in various crises (media, local and 
technical). As figure 1 shows it, residents were simultaneously concerned with the safety of the building site 
(technical crisis), the re-housing process, insurance issues, the management of material damage (local crises), and 
followed the media treatment of the event. For this reason, rather than stakeholders, it seems more appropriate to 
characterize such actors as stakeSholders. We talk of stakeSholders to restitute the complexity of their management: 
managing a stakeSholder involves to manage globally and coherently the set of stakes for which the actor is 
concerned. If these various stakes were not dealt with coherently, there would be high risks of dissonance in the 
management of the stakeSholder. 
This difficulty is further amplified by the fact that most frequently, a same stake/issue involves many stakeSholders. 
For example, residents and pupils’ parents were both deeply concerned by the information issue about the causes of 
the accident. At the same time, their preoccupations diverged. Whereas residents were directly concerned with 
reparation actions and the safety of the area, parents were focused on the relocation of their children.  
Therefore, each stakeholder appeared to be simultaneously concerned with various stakes, and each stake involved 
many stakeholders. Because of this intricacy between the “stakes” and the “holders”, the organization had a limited 
ability to manage its stakeSholders unilaterally and independently from the others (as traditional stakeholder 
perspective suggest). The special treatment of one stakeSholder would have bounced off on the management of the 
other stakeSholders. A direct, one-to-one relationship between the company and its stakeSholders would have 
endangered the coherence of crisis management and might have opened a dangerous escalation and bargaining 
process between the company and its stakeSholders.  
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Figure 1: a representation of the crisis management towards stakeSholders 
 
By and large, the institutional positioning of the company is a response to this risk: it enabled to define and to 
communicate a global position that the company would adopt to treat the “stakes” and the “holders”. Coherence in 
stakeSholders management was also achieved by focusing on issues rather than stakeSholders. StakeSholders were 
not taken care directly and bilaterally during the operational stage of crisis management. Issues constituted a more 
relevant lever of action for the crisis management process, and enabled to guide operations coherently. This focus on 
issues opened the way to a coherent treatment of stakeholders who were involved in a same issue, and it contributed 
to treat each stakesholder coherently for all its related issues, according to the institutional positioning adopted. 
 
Organizing for coherent action and quick-learning: matching crisis expert leadership with 
“anchorage points” mobilization. 
So far, we have presented how actors designed a common positioning, and how the company managed its 
stakeSholders as it entered into the operational stage of crisis management. But we have not extensively discussed 
the organizational aspects of operational crisis management. The form of organization that was set up to manage the 
crisis combined a clear and top-down leadership of the crisis, and the mobilization of various internal actors, chosen 
because of their expertise or because of their earlier participation to the project and their contacts with stakeSholders. 
This tightly coupled organization enabled the company to act coherently and to develop fast learning and adaptation 
capabilities. 
As we showed, the leadership of the crisis management process was quickly established inside the company. Every 
actors were aware that the crisis cell and the crisis expert were in charge of the internal coordination activity and the 
various actions and decisions. This was of primary importance to ensure a global coherence of various actions in the 
responsibility positioning. Nevertheless, the crisis communication expert was unable to deal with all the issues. She 
could not be physically everywhere. Moreover, she did not always have the required legitimacy or expertise to 
intervene alone. Therefore she had to mobilize additional resources and actors. In this respect, a critical factor for 
operational crisis management relied on her ability to spot and to mobilize people who were previously involved in 
the project. We call them “anchorage points”. These actors were involved in the project before the crisis. In their 
day-to-day activities, they developed useful knowledge in this project context. It could be related to an expertise (as 
the legal department manager) or stakeSholders relationships (as the project local mediator). They revealed of great 
value to recover from the crisis.  
The tightly coupled form of organization between the crisis expert leader and the “anchorage points” reveals the 
issues of close coordination and learning in crisis management. The “anchorage points” had specific knowledge 
about certain issues and/or had developed relationships with several stakeSholders. However, they could not 
continue to act as they did before the crisis. The local mediator is a good example of this problem. Before the crisis, 
he had developed trustful relationships with local actors and thorough knowledge about their behaviours. After the 
crisis, he continued to play his role and sent his monthly letter to the residents without coordinating with the crisis 
communication expert. This loose coupling could have proved very dangerous for the coherence of the messages sent 
by the firm, and because it was necessary to be very careful with the jurisdictional value of corporate messages after 
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the accident. Once this coupling problem was identified, the crisis management expert did not exclude the local 
mediator from the crisis management process. On the contrary, he was intensively mobilized to solve the local crisis 
because of his previous relationships with residents, parents and teachers. As a result, following Hatchuel and Weil 
(Hatchuel and Weil, 1995), we can say that the transformation of the situation (from normal operations to crisis) 
required a “metamorphosis of actors”: the knowledge that they previously detained had to be “updated” to the crisis 
environment, by the crisis management expert.  
Reciprocally, the crisis expert leader could catch important information thanks to the various “anchorage points”. He 
needed to be close to actions to quickly react if needing be. Moreover very close interactions with each “anchorage 
point” were requested to have a comprehensive crisis representation and ensure its coherence. This helped him to 
undertake right actions in good timing and to make them evolve.  The double stream of information – top/down and 
bottom/up – allowed quick crossed learning. They revealed decisive for the crisis management achievement.  
 
DISCUSSION: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The qualitative analysis provided in the second part of the paper has enabled us to develop a more practice-based 
view of stakeholder management in a crisis situation. In this last section, we would like to synthesize our research 
findings, and then to develop practical and research implications that can be drawn from this case study.  
 
Research findings 
Our two research questions related to the way an organization concretely deals with its stakeholders during a crisis. 
By stakeholders, we meant both internal and external stakeholders of the company. Inside the organization, it is 
important to understand how unity is achieved among various actors in such a disruptive episode where the 
organization is subject to centrifugal forces, threatened by internal dissension and chaos (Lagadec, 1993). Outside 
the organization, the issue is to develop fast learning capabilities, be able to grasp stakeholder dynamics and to take 
appropriate actions fast.  
To overcome those difficulties, the organization relied both on individual skills and on an ad-hoc organization, with a 
tight coupling between crisis experts and the various anchorage points. 
 
Individual skills 
As we have mentioned, the members of the crisis cell have played a key role in the crisis management process. In 
particular, it is important to stress the leadership role played by the internal crisis management expert, who had to 
handle internal dissensions within the company concerning the qualification of the crisis and the position that should 
be adopted. By identifying and advocating a “responsible” position, the crisis manager created a frame of reference 
suitable both within the firm and for the external stakeSholders. This was a critical issue for assuring internal 
coherence within the organization and providing a stable frame of reference towards external stakeholders. This 
actor’s competencies are twofold:  
- diagnosis capabilities: a critical issue, when the tunnel collapsed, was to be able to develop a common 
understanding of the situation and to agree on an organizational positioning very quickly. As we have said, this issue 
was not the easiest to manage: within the organization, there were internal dissensions regarding the organizational 
positioning to adopt. Many members, within the company; did not understand why the company should appear as 
publicly responsible for an event in which its jurisdictional responsibility was not directly involved. This responsible 
positioning was accepted because the crisis manager showed that it was a pragmatic way to achieve a goal for the 
organization: to continue the project. The ability to integrate the multiple constraints of the situation (no dead people 
but huge emotional impact, an institutional image of responsible organization that could be threatened by the crisis, 
good relationships with the local authorities, risks associated with a jurisdictional discourse) and then to identify 
pragmatic and achievable goals (the continuation of the project), were the central elements of these diagnosis skills. 
The responsible positioning was not only accepted because of its ethical value, but, rather, because it was seen as a 
meaningful solution to attain those objectives.  
- leadership capabilities: a second range of skills relates to the leadership capabilities of the crisis manager. We here 
refer to the ability to provide and communicate shared understandings and goals in a disrupted situation. In our case, 
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those competencies were critical to communicate and legitimate the organization’s responsible position and the 
related decisions. Moreover, this clear leadership of the crisis management set the way for a very centralized form of 
coordination (orchestrated by the crisis manager) between the various organizational members involved, to insure 
coherence between the various undertaken actions.  
 
… and an ad-hoc organizational structure 
However, those individual skills were not sufficient to resolve the crisis. Another critical factor relied on the ability 
to rely on an ad-hoc organization, which is essential for organizational resilience (Weick, 1993). This emergent 
organizational structure coupled various actors and competencies within the organization: the crisis cell regrouped 
different field of expertise and several key hierarchical members who also took part to the operational management 
of the crisis. Its scope of expertise was wide enough to integrate a wide variety of competencies and to develop a 
multi-facetted representation of the event. Moreover, the hierarchical position of the key actors enabled the crisis cell 
to develop a strategic vision and to take innovative decisions on behalf the organization. If the importance of those 
elements has already been identified by several researchers (Boin and Lagadec, 2000), they rarely constitute the 
norm when operational crisis management practices are considered. The absence of such patterns (representation of 
the various expertise required and hierarchical representation) raise risks of contradictions or mismanagement of the 
crisis.  
Second, our case shows that traditional actors within the organization may have a strong contribution for operational 
crisis management. In our case, the mobilization of “anchorage points”, i.e. actors involved in the project before the 
crisis, who were already in contact with key stakeholders as part of their day-to-day activities, constituted a key 
resource to manage the crisis. As we have seen, the identification of anchorage points enabled to reduce risks of 
dissonance in the treatment of the media, local and technical crises, to treat those crises in a global and coherent 
fashion, and to align the various messages sent from the organization towards its external stakeholders. Moreover, 
the various anchorage points had developed local knowledge about various issues around the project (neighborhood 
disturbances, local mediator, technical and jurisdictional issues) and the related stakeholders. This knowledge was 
very valuable for the crisis cell which could learn and adapt its actions to the local context. Thus, the very tight 
coupling between the crisis cell and the various anchorage points can be explained by two elements: the need to 
maintain coherence in the treatment of the crisis (the crisis cell engaged in top-down relationships concerning its 
positioning and related actions, prescribing very strongly the organization’s anchorage points); and the need to 
integrate the anchorage points’ various pieces of local knowledge to develop fast learning and adaptative capabilities 
(bottom-up relationship).  
 
Practical and theoretical implications 
 
Bridging crisis episodes and the normal life of an organization 
Crisis management studies tend to separate a crisis episode from the study of ‘normal operations’ (Bourrier, 2002) 
and from the rest of the organizational life. As Bourrier (2002) has shown it, the study of normal operations should 
help understand and refine the researchers’ understanding of the crisis, and bring organizational design into crisis 
management research. Reciprocally, our case suggests that the normal life of an organization offer resources for the 
management of a crisis, which should not be overlooked by researchers and managers. In our case, the normal life of 
the organization has played a role at least in two ways. First, the long term institutional positioning of the company 
provided a resource to manage the crisis. Its responsible and public service image, the strong insertion of the 
company into the urban environment made its responsible positioning more coherent and acceptable by the various 
stakeholders. Second, the mobilization of anchorage points shows that it may be crucial to link crisis management 
with day-to-day organizational life. From a practical point of view, it means that the identification and management 
of anchorage points can be an important issue for crisis management. Because of the size of the organization, the 
need to take quick actions and the small number of members within the crisis management team, there may be 
important risks to miss several anchorage points during a crisis. To prevent risks of dissonance between talk and 
actions, and develop an appropriate representation of local issues and ways to handle them, it may be important for 
organizations to quickly spot their most relevant anchorage points during a crisis.  
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What is the value of a stakeholder perspective for crisis management?  
We would like to conclude with a brief discussion of the potential value of a stakeholder perspective for crisis 
management. As we have seen, stakeholder models can provide an interesting framework for diagnosing a situation 
and designing an appropriate and legitimate organizational position. More specifically, a stakeholder representation 
of the situation helps to underline the limits of a strictly jurisdictional position of the company that may appear as 
unbearable and illegitimate to the various stakeholders involved in the situation. In our case study, we have seen how 
the company decided to move beyond the jurisdictional debate and respond to the emotional impact generated by the 
crisis. Defining its position on the base of its jurisdictional responsibility might have turned highly damaging for the 
company image. Here, a stakeholder representation is helpful to decouple the communicational and jurisdictional 
arenas and to evaluate the potential damage that may be generated by stakeholders’ opposition. Moreover, a 
stakeholder representation of the crisis points to the necessity to take into account the acceptability and the way the 
stakeholders perceive the organizational position as legitimate (Suchman, 1995).  
In spite of those elements, the detailed analysis of a crisis management process contradicts several hypotheses made 
by stakeholder theories about organizational behavior in times of crisis (see first part) : 
- organizational behavior is more a pragmatic and goal-oriented response than a cultural response to a clear 
stimuli from outside stakeholders, which would mechanically derive from corporate inclination towards 
stakeholders (Alpaslan et al., 2004, Sethi, 1979, Shrivastava and Siomkos, 1989).  
- most approaches about stakeholder management do not question the existence or identity of the 
stakeholders that the company decides to manage. This point may be particularly important in ambiguous 
and complex situations, where responsibilities are blurred, which was the case at the beginning of the crisis 
we have presented. To some extent, the institutional positioning of the company “enacted” its environment, 
the issues and the stakeholders it had to manage (Weick, 1995). Had the company opted for a denial 
position, rejecting the responsibility on the builder of the site or the local authorities, it would probably not 
have had to manage such stakeholders as the pupils and the residents, and would probably have 
concentrated its efforts on jurisdictional issues for establishing that its responsibility was not involved. As a 
result, it can be said that the company created its stakeholders, at least to some extent. This proposition is as 
valid as the idea that the stakeholders had clear demands towards the organization.  
- A stakeholder perspective on crisis management tends to bypass several key operational difficulties of 
operational crisis management, like for example the difficulty to align the internal stakeholders of the 
company, or to bring into the analysis various organizational variables that are central for understanding 
crisis management. 
- The traditional imagery of stakeholder management provides an inaccurate/misleading vision of the 
complexity of operational crisis management. Rather than stakeholders, the company has to manage 
stakeSholders, which is a far more complicated task. We propose the term stakeSholders to show that each 
stakeholder can be in touch with various stakes/issues among the three levels identified above: 
communication / technical / local. And several stakeSholders can be simultaneously involved on the same 
stake/issue. For the coherence of the crisis management and the organizational positioning, it would be very 
risky, for a corporation, to manage its stakeholders unilaterally. Rather, the company has to manage a set of 
inter-related issues in a coherent fashion. To deal with stakeSholders coherently, the company managed 
them through issues.  
 
As a result, stakeholder perspectives provide a useful model for diagnosing a situation at the beginning of the crisis, 
but seem more limited for the analysis of real crisis management practices. Those limitations indicate ways to 
improve towards a practice-based approach of stakeholder and crisis management. In particular, a stakeholder 
perspective on crisis management should move from the mapping of stakeholders to the origins and transformational 
dynamics of “stakes” and “holders”. This would imply to link the dynamics of stakes (issues) to the emergence and 
transformation of holders (actors), to investigate the learning dynamics involved in those processes (Acquier and 
Aggeri, 2005), and to account for the way the actors manage the many operational constraints of a crisis.   
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has discussed the utility and limits of stakeholders approaches for crisis management. Based on an in-
depth and diachronic analysis of a case study, it has explained how stakeholder representations helped to build and 
legitimate an institutional positioning, both internally and externally, in the initial diagnosis phase. However, 
limitations of actionabily have been pointed out for the following implementation phase. The existence of 
intertwined levels of crisis and stakeholders has led us to depict them more accurately as stakeSholders. In order to 
deal with this complexity, crisis issues reveal to be a more accurate lever of action for the company we studied. 
Managing coherently the whole facets of a crisis necessitates a tightly coupled management of the crisis issues. This 
is achieved through an ad-hoc organization. It gathers a clear expert leadership who is able to spot and manage 
“anchorage points” as valuable resources for crisis management. The dynamics of learning between these two kinds 
of actors favors the recovery from crisis.  
Additionnally this analysis contributes to understand the links which exist between the normal life of an organization 
and crises. Beyond crisis management per se, this pleads for following researches linking risk management and crisis 
management in a learning and dynamic perspective. 
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